The history of the Bangsamoro peace process reveals a persistent structural flaw: the assumption that Muslim Mindanao constitutes a single political community governable under one autonomous framework. In reality, the Moro struggle has always reflected profound geographic, ethnic, and political distinctions that no single institutional arrangement has adequately resolved.
Since the aftermath of the 1968 Jabidah Massacre, the Philippine government has negotiated separately with competing Moro revolutionary movements while leaving their divergent constituencies politically unreconciled. The result has been a succession of peace agreements that reduced armed conflict temporarily but failed to establish durable political stability across the Bangsamoro South.
The proposal for two autonomous regions is therefore not a radical innovation but a restoration of an earlier political recognition. During the administration of Ferdinand Marcos Sr., Presidential Decree No. 1628 and related issuances created two separate regional structures — one for Central Mindanao and another for the Sulu archipelago, including Tawi-Tawi and Basilan. Although these arrangements emerged within an authoritarian setting, they nevertheless acknowledged that Muslim Mindanao was never politically homogeneous.
That recognition disappeared after the 1987 Constitution consolidated these territories into a single autonomous structure, later reorganized into the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Rather than resolving internal divisions, the one-region arrangement intensified feelings of exclusion among constituencies that viewed BARMM as primarily reflecting Central Mindanao's political priorities.
The eventual exclusion of Sulu from BARMM — following its rejection of the ratification plebiscite in 2019 — further exposed the weakness of this model. Its removal reinforced long-standing Tausug perceptions that their political identity and historical experience differ fundamentally from those of the MILF-dominated mainland leadership.
The distinction between the Moro National Liberation Front and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front is not merely organizational but cultural and historical. The MNLF emerged from a secular-nationalist and pan-ethnic movement rooted strongly in the Tausug world and the legacy of the Sulu Sultanate. Historian Samuel K. Tan observed that Tausug political identity derives from a tradition of sovereignty predating the Philippine republic itself. The MILF, by contrast, developed from a more explicitly Islamic political orientation centered in Maguindanao and mainland Mindanao, with its own distinct priorities and leadership traditions. Compelling both constituencies into a single institutional structure has never produced the shared ownership that sustainable peace demands.
The constitutional basis for two autonomous regions already exists and does not require amending the 1987 Constitution. Article X, Section 15 refers generally to autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao without expressly limiting Congress to establishing only one. Article X, Section 18 further authorizes Congress to enact an organic act for each autonomous region. Read together, these provisions supply sufficient constitutional authority for Congress to establish a second autonomous region through ordinary legislation followed by plebiscite approval. Reinforcing this reading are the Equal Protection Clause under Article III, Section 1, which guards against unequal treatment of similarly situated communities, and Article II, Section 22, which recognizes the rights of indigenous cultural communities — a provision broadly applicable to distinct Moro ethno-political identities. Article II, Section 2, incorporating the generally accepted principles of international law, further supports this interpretation insofar as international standards affirm the right of peoples to meaningful political participation in structures responsive to their historical character.
Federalism remains the broader constitutional horizon for advocates of permanent Bangsamoro self-governance. But while federalism requires constitutional revision and nationwide political consensus, dual autonomy can already be pursued and achieved under the existing Constitution through legislation and plebiscite — making it an immediately viable and strategically prudent first step.
The issue is not division but recognition. Lasting peace in the Bangsamoro South requires acknowledging its dual historical character and granting both major constituencies institutions they can genuinely regard as their own. Establishing two autonomous regions would not weaken the Muslim cause — it would deepen participation, strengthen legitimacy, and build the durable foundation that the peace process has long been denied. ︎
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Dr. Darwin T. Rasul III is a feature writer, book author, and editorial opinion columnist with extensive experience in governance and political consultancy. He started his career as a legislative researcher, then a political consultant for some senators in the Senate of the Philippines from 1988 to 1992. He later served as ARMM's cabinet assistant secretary for seven years from 2012 to 2019, during which time he was also editor-in-chief of the autonomous government's official publication. From 2023 to 2025, he was engaged internationally by the European Union (EU), Germany, as a distinguished expert-consultant, who wrote and annotated the legislative briefs of all laws passed by the Bangsamoro Transition Authority (BTA-BARMM). He is currently the chief editor of the Bangsamoro Free Press and regular columnist of OpinYon.︎
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