Looking back forty years and beyond, was there anything anybody could have done to prevent or abort the EDSA People Power Revolution of February 1986?
The successful and peaceful EDSA I was the result of a long series of events and decisions, all of which resulted in the ouster of the Marcos Administration and the installation of the Cory Revolutionary Government.
The military and police that remained loyal to Marcos were repeatedly ordered to disperse the crowds gathered around Camps Crame and Aguinaldo, assault the rebel military and police and fire mortar and artillery on the rebel positions.
Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile and the RAM rebels evacuated the DND building and compound in Camp Aguinaldo and transferred to Camp Crame. However, they did this voluntarily and were not physically evicted.
From what we observed and gathered from other observers and witnesses, the deployment of anti-riot or civil disturbance units and the use of crowd dispersants like tear gas and water cannon were minimal and ineffective.
The loyal Marines that were deployed in battalion sized units were stopped by the civilian crowd. Artillery and mortar unit commanders did not implement orders to fire. Important air assets kept on defecting to the rebels.
Years after EDSA I, I formulated a triple strategy composed of:
(1) The use of smoke instead of live rounds by artillery and mortar units
(2) The firing of tear gas, not at the front ranks but rather at the rear ranks of the crowd (The brave are usually in front while the not so brave are usually in the middle or the back.)
(3) The employment of “false flag” snipers against the loyal military and police units.
The above, if implementable, might have worked up to the third day, the 24th. Almost two decades later, I had the opportunity to join an informal Saturday morning gathering of retired generals at a coffee shop in Rustan’s Makati. The PA CG, Maj. Gen. Josephus Ramas revealed that they did not have smoke rounds in Ft. Bonifacio. By the time that they thought about it, the roads from Ft. Magsaysay had been blocked and there were no more PAF helicopter crews left that were still loyal and available.
There were other things that should have been done immediately after the planned coup became known and imminent. The same goes for when the possible withdrawal of support from Marcos by Enrile and Ramos became apparent.
The NTC should have immediately put Radio Veritas off the air. Subsequently, when I was NTC Deputy Commissioner, I found out that Presidential Assistant Juan Tuvera had instructed the NTC Commissioner, Brig. General Ceferino Carreon, to do so. However, the NTC Legal Department and Broadcast Division Heads advised their boss to cover his back. They prepared the legal documents. However, this took so long that the Tarlac PC Provincial Command did the work with explosives in the early morning hours of Sunday, February 23.
I personally observed on the Greenhills side of the EDSA civilian encampment that when the radio broadcast signal of Radio Veritas dwindled or disappeared from the air, the influx of civilians into the EDSA Ortigas perimeter slowed down. Then, when Radio Bandido came on the air, the flow of arriving civilians noticeably increased.
On Sunday early evening, February 16, 1986, President Marcos reinstated Gen. Fabian Ver as AFP Chief of Staff. After the Agrava Commission made its report and while the Ninoy Aquino murder case was in the Sandiganbayan, General Ver was under suspension. In his place, AFP Vice Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, was the acting AFP Chief of Staff.
If Ver had not been reinstated and Ramos was the acting AFP Chief of Staff on Saturday, February 22, the arrest of Minister Bobby Ongpin’s security detail may not have occurred or may have been resolved amicably. Secretary Enrile may not have urged acting AFP Chief of Staff and PC/INP Chief Lt. Gen. Ramos to join him at the DND in Camp Aguinaldo in withdrawing support from the Marcos Administration.
The RAM rebels may have proceeded with their military coup without expecting or counting on People Power. Although it is obvious that Enrile was involved in the planned coup, it is not clear what Ramos’s involvement and reaction would have been.
If former Antique Gov. Evelio Javier had not been assassinated on the capitol grounds in San Jose de Buenavista, on February 11, 1986, the popular anger caused by the administration cheating in the February 7 snap elections would not have gotten an added boost.
If Cory and Doy had not united at the last minute with the help of Jaime Cardinal Sin, Marcos could have won without having to cheat.
If Marcos had not announced the holding of snap elections in an ABC TV interview on November 4, 1985, there would be no EDSA I in February 1986.
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